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Abstract
Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studying
choice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposed over the
long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. The existence of so many
models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy, obscuring key insights
into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about the essential properties of pref-
erential choice. We provide a synthesis of formal models of risky, multiattribute, and
intertemporal choice, three important domains in decision making. We identify recur-
ring insights discovered by scholars of different generations and different disciplines
across these three domains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing mod-
els as involving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computational
properties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical development in
decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities and differences
between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses and empirical tests.
Keywords: decision making, mathematical and computational modeling, risky choice,
multiattribute choice, intertemporal choice
1 Introduction
Decision making is a central topic in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, eco-
nomics, finance, marketing, health, environmental sciences, and management (Barberis &
Thaler, 2003; Baron, 2008; Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Camerer et al., 2011; Glimcher &
Fehr, 2013; Kaplan & Frosch, 2005; Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015; Seip & Wenstop, 2006;
Simonson et al., 2001). Decision research is now also a significant driver of government
policy (Halpern, 2016; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). A major goal of decision research has
been to describe, predict, and prescribe human choice behavior. This goal is often pursued
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by developing mathematical and computational decision models. These models transform
the set of choice options available to the decision maker into deterministic or probabilistic
choices. Much theoretical research has been devoted to generating new decision models,
each making own assumptions about how payoffs, attribute levels, probabilities, time delays,
and other components of choice options are transformed and combined to explain observed
patterns of choice.
There is a profusion of such models. In preparing this paper, we identified over 150
distinct mathematical and computational models published before 2018 which are aimed
at modeling choices. Typically, the choices modelled are binary (between two options)
and the options themselves have only a few payoffs or attribute values. Inevitably, when
there are so many models using so few inputs to predict a small set of choice patterns,
the models overlap in their key properties. Moreover, with so many related models, often
expressed using different terminology and notation, and interpreted using different intuitive
psychological mechanisms, it is difficult for scholars to acquire a comprehensive view of the
field and to keep up with the proliferation of new variants. This may result in redundancy
and makes it difficult for new researchers to see the wood for the trees. Indeed, despite
all this model development, unified theories of choice have not emerged, even over the
relatively small set of behavioral regularities documented in the empirical literature.
The purpose of this paper is to synthesize seven decades of interdisciplinary theoretical
decision making research, to provide a road map of existing decision models and to enable
new and established researchers to locate their work on this map. We do this by identifying
eight core mathematical and computational properties at play in preferential choice and using
these to classify existing models. Our classification provides a way to identify similarities
and differences between models and can be used to aid both theoretical analyses and
empirical tests. It can also shed light on trends and patterns that have so far guided theoretical
developments in decision research. More importantly, current and future researchers will
be able to use our framework to increase their theoretical efficiency and encourage them to
build on, rather than re-invent, the work of previous generations.
2 Decision Modeling
2.1 The Structure of the Choice Problem
The great majority of ‘real-world’ decisions involve options that combine multiple attributes
with a range of costs and benefits over time and various degrees of risk and uncertainty.
In the face of such complexity, the approach adopted by decision researchers has been to
subdivide the task and develop models in three domains, each focused on one aspect of
overall choice. Typically, therefore, multiattribute choice models concern the values placed
on objects or events with several characteristics, risky choice models concern how we
weigh those values as a function of how likely they are to occur, and intertemporal choice
models concern how we weigh those values as a function of when they occur. The models
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we discuss in this paper therefore form part of the constructive or “divide and conquer”
approach to decision modeling, in that researchers systematically strive to understand each
aspect of choice, before ultimately attempting to “put it all together” (Lichtenstein & Slovic,
2006).
As a consequence of this divide and conquer approach, decision researchers have mostly
focused on simple choice tasks, rarely more complex than those shown in Table 1. The
role of simple tasks like these has been likened to that of fruit flies in genetics, since they
provide stripped-down scenarios that represent basic components of the choices people
make in their everyday lives (Kahneman, 2000).
Table 1: Structure of a typical choice problem, with two choice options X and Y. The column
labels represent events, moments in time, or attributes, and the individual cells, denoted x i
and y i, are the resolutions for these columns (e.g. payoffs contingent on different events,
payoffs obtained at different time periods, or realizations of different attributes).
c1 c2 c3
X x1 x2 x3
Y y1 y2 y3
The available options (the choice set) are represented by the rows labelled X and Y.
Researchers have predominantly focused on cases where only one item can be chosen from
a choice set. The interpretation of the columns depends on the domain: in multiattribute
choice, they denote option attributes, features, or commodities; in the context of risk, they
denote either collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive states of the world, or collec-
tively exhaustive and mutually exclusive probabilities; and in the context of intertemporal
choice they denote specific moments in continuous time. To refer to the characterisations
collectively, we will simply use the term column, but when the column has specific char-
acteristics we will mention them. (Although our review will be limited to multiattribute
choice, risky choice and intertemporal choice, the Table 1 structure is in fact rather more
general: see Baron (2008) and Wakker (2010, Appendix D) for a similar approach that
extends to other domains, including welfare theory and normative analysis.)
For each option, the contents of each cell are what we will call a column resolution,
or simply a resolution. This term is new, but we chose it because several terms have been
adopted to refer to similar concepts in various contexts (Wakker, 2010 appendix D), and
we sought a new term to embrace all concepts. Roughly, it is the consequence/outcome
of receiving or experiencing the option, given the column. In multiattribute choice, the
column denotes a class of attributes, features, dimensions, or commodities and the column
resolution is a qualitative or quantitative level of that column. For instance, in a choice
set of cars, the columns could denote paint colour, fuel efficiency, and so on. The column
resolutions would contain specific instantiations of the corresponding attributes, such as
“Red” or “40 miles per gallon” (depending on the column).
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In the case of intertemporal choice, the column resolutions are the outcomes occurring at
that moment in time for each option in the choice set. As time is continuous, any table (and,
typically in experiments, any option description) specifies only moments when something
happens for at least one option. For instance, consider the choice between $100 now and $0
in one year, or $0 now and $150 in one year. A table representation for this choice typically
specifies two columns, corresponding to now and one year from now, but does not explicitly
represent what happens at every moment in between and beyond these points in time.
The columns in risky choices are often described as events or states of the world (e.g.,
raining tomorrow versus not raining tomorrow), or as event probabilities with the nature
of the events unspecified but column headings adding up to 1, such as 25%, 30%, 45%.
The option “if it is sunny tomorrow, we go to the seaside” is of the first type: the column
is “sunny tomorrow”, the resolution is “go to the seaside”. An alternative presentation is
“you have a 25% chance of going to the seaside” in which the column is “a 25% chance”.
Note that in some risky choice experiments, options are described just in terms of the
probabilities of different resolutions that may or may not be independent of one another.
For example, decision makers could be asked to choose between a 20% chance of $40
and nothing otherwise, or a 50% chance of $15 and nothing otherwise. but may not be
told how these sums of money are positioned in various states of the world. In this case
the same set of options could be represented in different ways in table form, depending
on different assumptions about gamble independence. Although some models regard all
such representations as equivalent, there are other models where the differences in how the
resolutions across events or states of the world are juxtaposed would allow for different
patterns of choice. One strength of using a framework based on a table format is that it
helps us to identify when such considerations do or do not matter for the implications of a
model.
Behavioural models of multiattribute choice, intertemporal choice and risky choice
are often contrasted against a baseline model with a functional form corresponding to a
weighted sum. Each resolution xi has a subjective value v(xi); these values are assigned a
decision weight wi based on what the column is; and the overall value of option X is given
as: V(X) = Σwiv(xi). For a given choice set, the option with the highest weighted subjective
value is assumed to be chosen.
In risky choice, the baseline model is expected utility theory, where weights are state
probabilities and values of resolutions are represented by utility indices (Von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1944). In intertemporal choice, the baseline model is discounted utility
(Samuelson, 1937), according to which the present value of dated consumption utility
decreases exponentially with its delay. In the baseline model of multiattribute choice, the
weights capture the subjective importance of the attributes and values of resolutions depend
on attribute-specific utility functions (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). These models are sometimes
considered to be normative because their functional forms can be derived from consistency
axioms that appeal to assumed principles of rationality. However, the normative status of
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baseline models (and indeed many other axiomatically-based models) is controversial, since
most axioms have been challenged not only on empirical, but also on normative grounds.
2.2 A Patchwork of Models
As predictors of choice, the baseline models have turned out to be inadequate: almost from
the moment they were first formulated, empirical patterns of behavior contradicted them.
These failures stimulated the development of descriptive models, usually by modifying
the baseline model through the addition of assumptions about the computations involved
in transforming and aggregating columns and their resolutions. The rate at which these
models were developed received a huge boost with the publication of (original) prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This watershed event led to alternative models of
choice, not limited to risky choice, being produced on an almost industrial scale. Starmer
(2000) described how there was a “hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk”
during the last two decades of the 20th century. He discussed more than twenty models
drawn primarily from economics (to which he might have added another twenty, primarily
from psychology). Even in 2000 it might have seemed strange that a relatively small number
of choice patterns involving a few simple options could support the production of so many
differentiated models. But far from running out of steam, the theory production process
has continued unabated. We suggest four reasons for this (recognising that there may be
others).
First, the same choice patterns can be interpreted and explained by a variety of functional
forms and/or diverse psychological insights. Second, the pursuit of model parsimony can
restrict the permissible degrees of freedom so much that while each model can account
for some behavioral phenomena, none can account for all. Third, researchers often focus
on one or a few choice phenomena, and even small changes in what the researcher wants
to explain can lead to different models. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because
rewards in science are heavily weighted toward developing new models and demonstrating
their accuracy, the development of these models (rather than testing existing models or
consolidating “old” ones) has been the priority of most researchers.
So instead of an increasingly streamlined and consolidated and integrated set of choice
models, we are now faced with a patchwork of competing models offering seemingly novel
assumptions and generating a variety of nuanced behavioral predictions. In all three domains
of choice – risky, intertemporal and multiattribute – behavior has not been captured by a
small number of agreed core principles.
This problem already existed half a century ago. The pioneering mathematical psy-
chologists Krantz, Atkinson, Luce and Suppes (1974) excluded preferential choice research
from their seminal survey of mathematical psychology arguing that while “there is no lack
of technically excellent papers in this area . . . they give no sense of any real accumulation
of knowledge.” They then asked a question that has still not been answered: “what are the
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established laws of preferential choice behavior?” (pg. 7). In this paper we hope to make
some progress towards establishing, if not the laws themselves, a framework for such laws.
2.3 Model Overlap
One consequence of the abundance of decision models relating to a restricted domain is that
models overlap. Researchers draw on highly similar mechanisms to achieve highly similar
empirical predictions, often independently and often without drawing links between the
models. As an example, consider the following models which treat desirability differences
between pairs of options as being (at least over some range) convex in the differences
between resolutions within the same Table 1 column: regret theory (Loomes & Sugden,
1982), salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012), the importance sampling model (Lieder
et al., 2017), the similarity contrast model (Mellers & Biagini, 1994), random regret
minimization (Chorus et al., 2008), the similarity overlap model (Restle, 1961), the feature
matching model (Houston et al., 1989), the focusing model (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013),
the tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2010), the lexicographic semiorder model (Tversky,
1969), and the generalized similarity model (Leland, 1994, 2002; Rubinstein, 1988, 2003).
The first three models focus on risky choice, the next four on multiattribute choice, the
next three on intertemporal choice, and the last two have been applied to all three domains.
The risky choice models give disproportionate importance to larger differences between
resolutions (typically payoffs) in the same state of the world; the intertemporal choice
models give greatest importance to the largest within-time-period differences in resolutions
(again, typically payoffs); and the multiattribute models give the greatest importance to the
attribute categories on which resolutions (typically attribute levels) differ most.
These models are not identical in their mathematical representation, and they may ap-
peal to different psychological mechanisms to justify the key idea, including emotions,
perceptual discrimination, and attention. However, despite any differing psychological jus-
tifications, all the models share a central insight about choice behavior. The fact that so
many researchers have independently proposed models that give disproportionate impor-
tance to larger differences between column resolutions suggests that this idea might capture
if not a law, then at least a property of preferential choice behavior.
Due to the large number of existing models, as well as the cross-disciplinary nature
of decision research and because models may diverge in their psychological interpretation
while having similar underlying mathematical assumptions (and consequently behavioral
predictions), many instances of overlap are not immediately obvious. This restricts the
opportunity for researchers to build on each other’s insights, and scientific energy is likely
to be dispersed in repeatedly rediscovering the same set of core theoretical insights (see He
et al., in press, a, for a complementary computational investigation of model overlap).
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3 Overview of Approach
3.1 Generating a List of Models
We offer a stylised and high-level map of the world of decision modeling. This map
characterizes the basic mathematical and computational properties from which models
are formed and suggests a metatheoretical structure whose dimensions represent the main
avenues of theoretical insights and developments in decision making research. These
dimensions are currently our best approximations to the laws of preferential choice behavior
requested by Krantz et al. (1974).
We built this map by observing similarities across a wide set of existing models of
risky, intertemporal, and multiattribute choice. Our list of models spans seven decades of
theoretical research, and includes models from a wide array of fields, including psychology,
cognitive science, economics, management, marketing, and neuroscience. We compiled this
list using a multistage process. We began by searching Google Scholar for published models
with search queries “risky choice model”, “risky decision model”, “intertemporal choice
model”, “intertemporal decision model”, “multiattribute choice model”, and “multiattribute
decision model”. To this list we added models discussed in regular review papers published
in outlets such as the Annual Review of Psychology and the Journal of Economic Literature
(Becker & McClintock, 1967; Edwards, 1954, 1961; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Frederick
et al., 2002; Hastie, 2001; Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015; Payne et al., 1992; Pitz & Sachs,
1984; Rapoport & Wallsten, 1972; Simonson et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 1977; Starmer,
2000; Weber & Johnson, 2009). We then used citation chaining to obtain all papers citing
our models or cited by our models, and from these papers, extracted additional models
that were not present in our initial list. Finally, we circulated our list of models to the
mailing list of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, and with feedback from our
colleagues, were able to add some additional model to this list. Note that our approach
is likely to exclude very recent models, which is why we manually searched prominent
psychology, economics, management, marketing, and neuroscience journals, for decision
models published from 2015 until 2018.
3.2 Scope of Analysis and Notable Omissions
Bearing in mind the breadth of the domains we consider, and the abundance of proposed
models, we made our theoretical synthesis manageable by focusing on formally specified
mathematical and computational models of multiattribute, risky, and intertemporal prefer-
ence that have specific functional representations. We only considered models designed
to describe choices (and other expressions of ordered preference) given choice sets that
can be expressed in a version of Table 1, and whose parameters can be “fit” using choice
data. These include behavioral utility-based models such as prospect theory, axiomatically
derived models which nonetheless have, or are commonly given, clear functional repre-
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sentations, such as expected utility theory, and cognitive models which depict choices as
the product of processes other than utility maximization, such as heuristic models and
accumulator models.
We did not include qualitative theories which do not make explicit the mathematical
structure of the computations they believe are at play in the decision process. We also
excluded very general axiomatic theories (e.g., Machina, 1982) which do not place func-
tional restrictions on the computations they propose. Another important omission involves
stochastic choice models that merely specify how noise influences choice, without restrict-
ing the utility function that is perturbed by that noise. These include strong utility models
(Fechner, 1860/1912; Luce, 1959; Thurstone, 1927), random preference models (Becker et
al., 1963), as well as other variations of this approach (see Baltas & Doyle, 2001; Bhatia &
Loomes, 2017; Hutchinson, 1986; Wilcox, 2008 for reviews).
We also excluded models whose main goal is to characterize the learning processes
involved in choice (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), models of experience-based (rather than
description-based) choice (e.g., Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995; Hertwig & Erev, 2009), models
that attempt to describe the influence of anchors, reference points, frames, response modes,
or other salient contextual features of the choice task (e.g., Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), models pertaining to choice deferral, choice confidence
or related choice variables (e.g., Bhatia & Mullett, 2016; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010),
as well as models of social and strategic decision making (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999), risk perception (e.g., Slovic, 1987), and ambiguity-based choice (e.g.,
Gilboa & Marinacci, 2016; Trautmann & van de Kuilen, 2015). These models often use the
computations discussed in this paper. However, they also feature additional assumptions due
to the more complex nature of the behavior they describe. We also excluded models of social
judgment, perceptual judgment, categorization, reasoning, and memory (see Holyoak &
Morrison, 2012), and applications of decision models such as multi-criteria decision analysis
and conjoint analysis (see Green & Srinivasan, 1978; Triantaphyllou, 2013). Models in
these and related domains can be extended to describe multiattribute choice, but need to be
excluded for tractability and manageability.
Despite these restrictions, our synthesis involves over 150 different mathematical and
computational models of risky, intertemporal, and multiattribute decision making, and is
based on the largest and most comprehensive list of decision models in existence. Please
see the appendix for the full list of models discussed in this paper.
3.3 Properties Examined
We limit our analysis to properties thought to be at play when evaluating the canonical
options that can be described using Table 1. Recall that baseline models such as expected
utility theory, the weighted additive model, and the discounted utility model, define the total
value of an option in terms of the sum of independent values assigned to each resolution,
weighted by some function of the column, summed over all columns. Alternative decision
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models have been constructed by permitting more complex interactions, transformations,
and operations involving the rows and columns of Table 1. We divide these computations
into three categories of properties.
The first category relates to the types of interactions between the components of choice
options that are permitted by the models. Baseline models entail (a) independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), and (b) independence of outcomes (or separability). In this
paper, IIA is an axiom of revealed preference, entailing that the value placed on an option is
not influenced by the other options available. Under common assumptions, it is equivalent
to transitivity. Otherwise, adding unchosen options to a choice set could potentially change
which option is chosen (see Rieskamp et al., 2006 for a detailed overview). This condition
should not be confused with Arrow’s (1951) social choice condition which has the same
name but is formally different. The independence – also referred to as the separability – of
outcomes implies, under common assumptions, that the value of an option is a weighted sum
of independent values placed on each resolution of that option. Many alternative models
drop one or both assumptions. Some allow for the resolutions of one option to influence
the transformation and aggregation of other resolutions within the same option, hence
potentially violating independence of outcomes (within-option interaction). Others allow
for the resolutions of one option to influence how resolutions of other options are treated,
potentially violating independence of irrelevant alternatives (between-option interaction).
The second category pertains to the types of transformations: that is, whether the
models modify how resolutions are transformed, or whether they modify how the columns
(probabilities, time delays, and attribute categories) are transformed and weighted.
The third and final category considers the operations used to implement the various
interactions and transformations: that is, whether models involve computations of ranks,
or similarities, or gains and losses, or transformations based on the statistical distributions
(e.g., average, variance, or range) of resolutions or columns.
These three categories of model properties play a fundamental role in characterizing
choice models. Models classified in the same way in all three categories will often have
similar theoretical underpinnings and entail similar behaviors. We consider a total of eight
different properties across these three categories, as summarised in Table 2. As we shall
see, there is substantial overlap among models in the use of (subsets of) these properties,
suggesting that they capture important recurring insights into the nature of preferential
choice.
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Table 2: An overview of the properties proposed as part of this synthesis.
Category 1: Types of interactions
1. Within-option interactions: Components of a choice option influence how other
components of the same option are evaluated
2. Between-option interactions: Components of a choice option influence how
components of other options are evaluated
Category 2: Types of transformations
1. Value transformations: Column resolutions (such as payoffs and attribute amounts)
are modified
2. Weight transformations: Probabilities, delays, and attribute weights are modified
Category 3: Operations
1. Ordinality: Rankings of resolutions or column weights play a role in determining
choice
2. Gains and losses: Positive and negative quantities are evaluated differently
3. Similarity and dissimilarity: Choices involve processing of resolution and weight
differences within or across options
4. Statistical distributions: The mean, variance, range and other distributional
characteristics of the options influence choice
4 Properties
4.1 Types of Interactions
4.1.1 Property 1: Within-Option Interactions.
We first consider interactions between the components of a single choice option. The
interaction can be between columns (and therefore between the weights assigned to each
resolution) or between the resolutions themselves. These interactions lead to violations of
independence of outcomes conditions or axioms which entail that an option can be treated as
the sum of the independent utilities of each resolution, weighted by an independent function
of its column attributes (see the discussion in Fishburn & Wakker, 1995). The best-known
independence of outcomes condition is the sure-thing principle (Savage, 1972), which holds
that preferences over gambles should not depend on common components: that is, a shared
resolution within the same column. For instance, in Table 1, imagine that gambles X and
Y yield the same resolution for the third event: that is, x3 = y3. The condition states that
preferences between these gambles will be unaffected by this shared value, so that replacing
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x3 = y3 with some other identical resolution x3´ = y3´ will not alter the decision maker’s
relative ranking of X and Y.
The same condition in multiattribute choice states that preferences over options do not
depend on shared attributes (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). It is called separability in consumer
theory. Similarly, in intertemporal choice, independence implies that if a common dated
outcome is added to two options, preferences between those options will be unaltered
(Read & Scholten, 2012). In intertemporal choice, independence axioms imply additive
separability, meaning that the present value of consumption at a given point does not depend
on what is before or after that point (e.g., Koopmans, 1960; see discussion in Loewenstein
& Prelec, 1993).
In contrast to the predictions of independence axioms, many decision models assume
within-option interactions, often that the column weight depends in some way on the
resolutions within that column. The best known such model is cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), which is equivalent to Luce and Fishburn’s (1991) rank
and sign-dependent model, and which holds that probability weighting depends on the
within-option rank of the resolutions corresponding to each probability for each option.
For example, in Table 1 the weight placed on column 3 for gamble X may be influenced
by how x3 ranks relative to x1 and x2. Models exploring and elaborating this idea with
varying assumptions regarding how probabilities are transformed (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999;
Lattimore et al., 1992; Prelec, 1998) also share this property, as do third generation prospect
theory (Schmidt et al., 2008), anticipated utility (Quiggin, 1982), dual theory (Yaari, 1987),
the security-potential/aspiration model (Lopes, 1987) and the gains decomposition utility
model (Marley & Luce, 2001). Within-option interaction is also a core property of the
rank-affected multiplicative weights and transfer of exchange models (Birnbaum & Chavez,
1997; Birnbaum, 2008), venture theory (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990), the skew-symmetric
bilinear theory and the weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983; Fishburn, 1982).
Variance-based models, including risk-value models (Dyer & Jia, 1997; Markowitz,
1959), the coefficient-of-variance model (Weber et al., 2004), and variance-skewness models
(Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Hagen, 1979), also incorporate within-option interactions. In
these models, value is partly determined by the overall dispersion of the resolutions (usually
monetary payoffs) within a gamble. This generates interactions within the gamble payoffs
and consequent violations of independence.
Disappointment-based models of risk are those in which each resolution in a risky option
is compared to some function of the other resolutions for the same option. There is a risk
of disappointment if the realized resolution is worse than those that might have happened
but did not. In many disappointment-based models (Bell, 1985; Jia et al., 2001; Loomes
& Sugden, 1986; Mellers et al., 1999), the utility of any single payoff is evaluated relative
to the overall expected value or expected utility of the gamble. Other disappointment-
based models compare individual payoffs with the certainty equivalent of the gamble (Gul,
1991), with the best possible payoff (Grant & Kajii, 1998), or even with every other payoff
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(Delquié & Cillo, 2006). A class of reference-dependent models, in which gambles serve
as their own reference points, also utilizes disappointment-like calculations to generate
within-option interactions (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007).
Within-option interactions also enter indirectly into models of risky choice that assume
that individual outcome probabilities (the columns) are compared to what would happen if
those probabilities were uniformly distributed over all columns, so that the weight assigned
to a given probability depends on the number of states of the world. These models include
prospective reference theory (Viscusi, 1989), the dual-system model of risk (Mukherjee,
2010), the dual-system model of affect and deliberation (Loewenstein et al., 2015), the noisy
retrieval model (Marchiori et al., 2015) and distracted decision field theory (Bhatia, 2014).
Aspiration-level models (Diecidue & Van de Ven, 2008) which add further calculations
based on the total probability of surpassing target payoffs also indirectly permit within-
option interactions. Original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) incorporates
within-option interactions through its assumption that probabilities associated with identical
payoffs in the same gamble may be combined during editing (before being assigned a
decision weight).
Finally, within-option interactions appear in heuristic models of risky choice, such
as Payne and Braunstein’s (1971) information processing model, the priority heuristic
(Brandstätter et al., 2006), several of Thorngate’s (1980) heuristics and the BEAST model
(Erev et al., 2017). These models often involve the identification of the largest or smallest
resolution in a gamble or the most likely or least likely resolutions in a gamble, so that
changing one probability or resolution can affect how other probabilities and resolutions in
the same gamble are evaluated.
In contrast to risky choice, the modeling of specific within-option interactions is rel-
atively rare in multiattribute choice models. This may seem remarkable because this is
a domain in which within-option interactions are ubiquitous (for example, in the form of
attribute complementarity or substitutability), and much work has been done in decision
analysis to develop ways of measuring utility over multiattribute bundles, and to analyse the
effects of known patterns of interdependence (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). One reason
for not modeling these interactions is no doubt because it is difficult to create descriptive
behavioral models with interactions between resolutions that take the form of often incom-
mensurable attributes (e.g., a car with the resolution of red chassis in one column, and 40
miles per gallon in another). When interactions are modelled, it is assumed that attributes
can be mapped onto comparable scales, such as scores on different aspects of the same test,
or present/absent ratings. Interdependencies based on these conditions feature in configural
weight models, which can allow for multiplicative (Birnbaum, 1974), rank-based (Birnbaum
& Zimmermann, 1998), or range-based (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979) interactions between
resolutions. As with the above risky choice models, these models can violate independence
of outcomes. Ganzach’s (1995) attribute scatter model assumes that people prefer a high
degree of scatter within an option rather than options with the same mean but less scatter –
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which might mean a slow but very reliable car is preferred to one that is a bit faster and a
bit less reliable. Within-option interactions are also central to neural network models such
as the parallel constraint satisfaction model of heuristic choice (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008)
and the Co3/ECHO model (Holyoak & Simon, 1999) which allow for attributes to influ-
ence the activation of other attributes. Lastly, conjunctive and disjunctive heuristics, which
assume that decision makers focus on the best or worst resolutions within a choice option
(Dawes, 1964), can display these interactions, as can approximations of these heuristics that
represent the decision process with a non-linear utility function (Einhorn, 1970).
Just as in multiattribute choice, relatively few intertemporal choice models accommodate
within-option interactions between resolutions even though intertemporal preferences seem
highly likely to display interactions. One related line of modelling involves habit formation,
found in the model of rational addiction (Becker & Murphy, 1988), the discounted utility
model under habit formation Wathieu (1997), the satiation model (Baucells & Sarin, 2007),
and the satiation and habit formation model (Baucells & Sarin, 2010). A classic claim
is that improving sequences are valued over worsening ones, as if the more proximate
experience of plenty will be worsened by the anticipated experience of subsequent poverty
(e.g., Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). For monetary choices, preferences over resolution
sequences also display dominance violations, analogous to those observed when applying
(say) original prospect theory to gambles having more than two possible resolutions with
the same sign (see Scholten et al., 2016). Additional models that predict interactions
between resolutions include the conditional utility independence model (Bell, 1977), the
preferences over sequence model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), the mental accounting
model of savings and debt (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998), the monotone model (Blavatskyy,
2016), the extended tradeoff model (Read & Scholten, 2012) and the extended tradeoff
model with cumulative weighting of time (Scholten et al., 2016). It should be emphasized,
however, that much empirical research into intertemporal choice has circumvented the issue
of intertemporal separability by focusing on choices where within-option interactions cannot
occur: that is, choices involving a single smaller-sooner and larger-later option, with only
one column per option associated with a non-zero resolution.
4.1.2 Property 2: Between-Option Interactions.
The preceding section considered models that allow for interactions between the resolutions
and columns of a single option. If these are the only interactions, then a given option still has
its ‘own’ subjective value to a decision maker, irrespective of whatever alternative options
are available. Consequently, preferences between X and Y in Table 1 will not be affected
by the presence or absence of any other option Z. Nor will the decision maker display any
cyclical or intransitive pattern of choice (such as a preference for X over Y, Y over Z, and Z
over X).
By contrast, allowing for the components of an option to interact with components of
other options generates violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives, specified earlier
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as the principle whereby the preference between any two options should be independent
of any other options available in the choice set (see e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). This
is tantamount to saying that each and every option has its ‘own’ subjective value to an
individual, entailing transitivity.
Allowing between-option interactions means that the column weight(s) assigned to the
resolution(s) of a single option, or the value assigned to those resolutions, can be influenced
by the weights or resolutions of other options, either in the same or different columns.
Consequently, adding or removing otherwise irrelevant options from a choice set can lead
to reversals of preference orderings between the existing options. When the choice set
expands to more than three options, modelling the impact of the interactions may become
very complex.
The great majority of decision models that assume interdependence between options
limit this interdependence to that between resolutions for different options within the same
column. Using the notation from Table 1, these models allow interactions between xi and
yi but not between xi and yj for i ≠ j. Multiattribute models that assume between-option
interactions include many lexicographic and lexicographic semiorder heuristic models (e.g.,
Fishburn, 1974; Tversky, 1969), heuristic models that involve comparing good and bad
attribute resolutions with weights (Huber, 1979) and without weights (Russo & Dosher,
1983), the options as information model (Sher & McKenzie, 2014), the rank-weighted leaky
accumulator (Tsetsos et al., 2012), the subjective dominance model (Ariely & Wallsten,
1995), the random dominance model (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005), and a wide range of
heuristic models considered by Marewski and Mehlhorn (2011). In all these models, choice
is influenced by ordinal rankings of the options on different attributes, which leads to
interactions between the resolutions of different choice options. Thus, for example, the
desirability of a car with a given level of fuel efficiency may depend crucially on whether
that level of fuel efficiency is the highest out of all the cars in the choice set.
Between-option interactions are also present in multiattribute choice models that em-
phasize the role of option similarity, such as the similarity overlap model (Restle, 1961), the
feature matching model (Houston et al., 1989), the focusing model (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013),
the similarity contrast model (Mellers & Biagini, 1994), the comparison grouping model
(Guo & Holyoak, 2002), multiattribute salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2013), the sparse-
max model (Gabaix, 2014), the multi-alternative linear ballistic accumulator (Trueblood
et al., 2014), the stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo, 2002), the random-regret
minimization model (Chorus et al., 2008), the contextual utility model (Rooderkerk et al.,
2011), the comparative judgment model (Bhargava et al., 2000), the contextual concavity
model (Kivetz et al., 2004), and various models that incorporate the additive difference rule
(Tversky, 1969). All these models predict that adding or removing options from the choice
set alters the perceived similarities of the remaining options, which, in turn, may alter the
choice between them.
We can also observe between-option interactions in multiattribute models based on
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loss aversion, such as the componential context model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993), the
contextual loss aversion model (Kivetz et al., 2004), the loss aversion-based leaky com-
petitive accumulator (Usher & McClelland, 2004), and the conflict-mediated choice model
(Scholten, 2002). All these models assume that choice options are treated as gains and losses
relative to some other options in the choice set. Additionally, multiattribute models that
utilize the distribution of resolutions observed on a single attribute (e.g., the range of values
for that attribute in the choice set) to normalize the utilities of different options, display
these types of interactions. These models include range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1974;
Wedell & Pettibone, 1996), the neurocomputational range-normalization model (Soltani et
al., 2012), the Bayesian model of fair market value (Shenoy & Yu, 2013), the Bayesian
model of context sensitive value (Rigoli et al., 2017), and the similarity in context model
(Dhar & Glazer, 1996). In these models, the distribution of resolutions in a choice set can
be changed by adding or removing choice options.
Cognitive models that assume inhibitory interactions between different options and
attributes also display between-option interactions. These include multi-alternative decision
field theory (Roe et al., 2001), loss aversion-based leaky competitive accumulation (Usher
& McClelland, 2004), the cortical attractor network model (Wang, 2002), the hierarchical
competition model (Hunt et al., 2014), the divisive normalization model (Louie et al., 2013),
the 2n-ary choice tree model (Wollschläger & Diederich, 2012), the dynamic threshold
neural network (Usher & Zakay, 1993), and the accumulator rules model (Bhatia, 2017).
Between-option interactions can also be observed in the associative accumulation model
(Bhatia, 2013), the parallel constraint satisfaction model of decision making (Glöckner
& Betsch, 2008), and the Co3/ECHO model (Holyoak & Simon, 1999). These form a
related class of cognitive models, in which the attribute resolutions in the choice options
dynamically determine the weights associated with different attributes. As well as inhibitory
effects between options, some of these models predict between-option interactions due
to momentary fluctuations of attention (e.g., Bhatia, 2013; Roe et al., 2001; Usher &
McClelland, 2004; also see attentional drift diffusion models – Fisher, 2017; Krajbich et
al., 2010).
A closely related class of decision models based on threshold decision making also
predict between-option interactions. These include elimination by aspects and the pref-
erence tree model (Tversky, 1972), the matching heuristic (Dhami & Harries, 2001), the
elimination by least attractive heuristic (Montgomery & Svenson, 1976), and the satisficing
heuristic (Simon, 1955). Although threshold models do not explicitly feature interactions,
by allowing the resolutions of one option to influence the resolutions of another, they can
produce violations of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Many behavioral stochastic
choice models, such as the contextual utility model (Wilcox, 2011) and the wandering vector
model (Carroll & De Soete, 1991), similarly permit between-option interactions (typically
as a function of option similarity), and thus violate the stochastic axioms pertaining to
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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Some risky choice models allow for between-option interactions, primarily based on
computations of similarity or dissimilarity. Examples include regret theory (Bell, 1982;
Fishburn, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), the expected loss ratio model (Edwards, 1956),
the perceived relative argument model (Loomes, 2010), salience theory (Bordalo et al.,
2012), the importance sampling model (Lieder et al., 2017), decision affect theory (Mellers
et al., 1999), and the similarity models of Leland (1994) and Rubinstein (1988). These mod-
els utilize nonlinear transformations of differences between the payoffs and/or probabilities
in pairs of options to compute preferences.
Heuristic models often involve between-option interactions. These include the mini-
max and maximax heuristics (Thorngate, 1980), the minimax regret heuristic (Thorngate,
1980), as well as the low payoff and low expected payoff elimination heuristics (Thorngate,
1980), the information processing model (Payne & Braunstein, 1971), the priority heuris-
tic (Brandstätter et al., 2006), the consequence counting heuristic (Birnbaum, 2005), and
the most probable winner heuristic (Blavatskyy, 2006). Because these heuristic models
typically involve ordinal comparisons between resolutions and probabilities across differ-
ent gambles, they can violate independence of irrelevant alternatives. The BEAST model
(Erev et al., 2017) and the decision-by-sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006), which rely
on some of these heuristics, also display such between-option interactions. The editing
phase of original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), during which identical
probability-payoff combinations across gambles are cancelled out, also allows between-
option interactions, as does a reference-dependent extension of prospect theory in which
different gambles can serve as reference points for each other (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007).
Finally, the computationally rational choice model allows for ordinal comparisons across
gambles, mediated by expected value calculation, to influence choice (Howes et al., 2016).
In intertemporal choice, attribute-based models have been proposed in which the differ-
ences between resolutions determine preference. This is the case with the tradeoff model
(Scholten & Read, 2010) and the extended tradeoff model (Read & Scholten, 2012), the
proportional difference model (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016), the absolute and rela-
tive differences dynamic models (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014), as well as difference and ratio
similarity-based models such as those of Leland (2002 -- see also Cubitt et al.’s (2018)
and Kőszegi and Szeidl’s (2013) models, which feature a related property for multiattribute
intertemporal choices). Likewise, both the ITCH model (Ericson et al., 2015) and the
DRIFT model (Read et al., 2013) involve between option interactions, in that preference
for an option is determined by the rate of return provided by that option compared to other
options on the table, as well as differences between the resolutions of different options.
Additionally, the various interval discounting models (Read, 2001; Scholten & Read, 2006;
Scholten et al., 2014), the ASAP model (Kable & Glimcher, 2010), and the common-aspect
attention model (Green et al., 2005) propose the discount rate for any given option depends
on the delays to all options.
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4.1.3 Models without Interactions.
While most models assume either between-option or within-option interactions, a small
(but important) group do neither. Many of these models involve simplifications (rather than
generalizations) of expected utility theory, the weighted additive model or the discounted
utility model. For example, Dawes’ (1979) equal weights heuristic, as suggested by the
name, aggregates a subset of attributes democratically without considering which attribute
is a better predictor (unselected attributes get weights of 0). Similarly, the equiprobable
heuristic in risky choice (Thorngate, 1980), and the additive model of risky decision making
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968), assume choices are made without attending to probabilities.
This category also includes the subjective expected utility model of risky choice (Ed-
wards, 1955), which permits non-linear transformations of probabilities and payoffs, but
does not allow for interactions between the various components of the gamble, as well as
certainty equivalence theory (Handa, 1977) and the odds-based subjective weighted util-
ity model (Karmarkar, 1978). Finally, some risk-value models such as in Fishburn (1977)
compute risk using fixed exogenous target values, rather than expected values, thus avoiding
within-option interactions.
Many intertemporal choice models predict no interactions between the components of
the choice options while assuming non-exponential discount functions, usually a variant
of declining patience. These include the hyperbolic discounting model (Mazur, 1987), the
generalized hyperbolic model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), the quasi-hyperbolic model
(Laibson, 1997), the hyperbolic with value transformation model (Scholten et al., 2014), the
fixed cost model (Benhabib et al., 2010), the additive discounting model (Killeen, 2009),
the dual-systems model of affect and deliberation (Loewenstein et al., 2015), the double
exponential model (McClure et al., 2004), the constant-sensitivity model (Ebert & Prelec,
2007), the proportional discounting model (Harvey, 1994), and the exponential time model
(Roelofsma, 1996).
Finally, many dynamic decision models propose neither within- nor between-option
interactions. These include the ordinal and continuous multiattribute counter models (As-
chenbrenner et al., 1984), the descriptive multiattribute utility model (Weiss et al., 2010)
and the sequential accumulation model (Lee & Cummins, 2004).
Having discussed the classification of models according to the nature of any interactions
they allow, we now consider how models may be clustered according to which dimensions
they transform.
4.2 Types of Transformations
4.2.1 Property 3: Value Transformations.
Decision models often transform the resolutions of a choice option based on other resolutions
of the same option, or resolutions of different options. Many of these transformations apply
only to the values attached to the payoffs or attributes of the various options, that is v(xi).
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Risky choice models that involve value-based transformations include models of regret
(Bell, 1982; Fishburn, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and disappointment (Bell, 1985;
Delquié & Cillo, 2006; Jia et al., 2001; Loomes & Sugden, 1986; Mellers et al., 1999),
in which payoffs are evaluated relative to other payoffs in the same state of the world or
other payoffs in the same gamble, respectively. Decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1999),
which models both regret and disappointment, also involves value-based transformations.
Likewise, value transformations are found in models that utilize the variance of a gamble to
compute the gamble’s utility (Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Dyer & Jia, 1997; Fishburn, 1977;
Markowitz, 1959; Weber et al., 2004). These models penalize payoffs that diverge strongly
from the mean, as do others which factor skewness into the evaluation (Hagen, 1979).
We also find value transformations in models of intertemporal choice, including the
tradeoff and extended tradeoff models (Read & Scholten, 2012; Scholten & Read, 2010),
the DRIFT model (Read et al., 2013), the proportional difference model (Cheng & González-
Vallejo, 2016), the absolute and relative differences dynamic models (Dai & Busemeyer,
2014), and the ITCH model (Ericson et al., 2015). These particular models apply trans-
formations to differences or ratios between resolution amounts across options. Value
transformations are also a feature of sequence models of intertemporal choice (Loewenstein
& Prelec, 1993), in which people have preferences for increasing, decreasing, and dispersed
sequences of consumption. Relatedly, the mental accounting model of savings and debt
(Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998) assumes that resolutions in certain time periods can influ-
ence the value of resolutions in other periods, which generates various implicit value-based
transformations (see also Baucells & Sarin, 2007, 2010).
Multiattribute models that feature value transformations include the componential con-
text model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993), the loss-averse leaky competitive accumulator
model (Usher & McClelland, 2004), and the contextual loss aversion model (Kivetz et al.,
2004). Here the attribute resolutions for one option are evaluated based on whether they are
gains or losses relative to the (same column) resolutions for other options. Many other mul-
tiattribute models also involve transformations of attributes based on pairwise comparisons
with other attributes in the choice set. These include the additive difference rule (Tversky,
1969), the similarity contrast model (Mellers & Biagini, 1994), the random regret mini-
mization model (Chorus et al., 2008), the contextual concavity model (Kivetz et al., 2004),
the multi-alternative linear ballistic accumulator (Trueblood et al., 2014), the comparative
judgment model (Bhargava et al., 2000), the stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo,
2002), the nonlinear model (Einhorn, 1970), the options as information model (Sher &
McKenzie, 2014), and the decision by sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006). Range-based
multiattribute models include the range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1974; Wedell & Petti-
bone, 1996), the neurocomputational range-normalization model (Soltani et al., 2012), and
the similarity in context model (Dhar & Glazer, 1996). Variation-based models such as the
attribute scatter model (Ganzach, 1995), also often apply transformations to value rather
than decision weights.
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It is possible for payoffs and attributes to be transformed, such as through a utility
function, even if this transformation does not involve any within or between-option inter-
action. For example, expected utility theory imposes a (typically concave) transformation
on monetary payoffs, whereas prospect theory assumes that this transformation is concave
in the gain domain, convex in the loss domain, and that the disutility from losses is greater
than the utility from equivalent gains. Other utility functions include those of Friedman
and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952). Virtually all decision models incorporate some
such basic transformations. For expositional simplicity we do not provide a complete list
of these models.
4.2.2 Property 4: Weight Transformations.
Decision models that assume weight-based transformations modify the weights put on each
column based on the other columns of the same option, or the resolutions of other options.
Thus, the weight put on a single payoff or attribute – that is, wi – can be transformed based
both on the weights on other payoffs and attributes, wj, and the specific payoffs and attribute
levels, xi.
Risky choice models that involve weight-based transformations incorporate the many
variants of cumulative prospect theory (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Lattimore et al., 1992;
Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wakker & Tversky, 1993) and the rank and sign-
dependent utility model (Luce & Fishburn, 1991), third generation prospect theory (Schmidt
et al., 2008), the gains decomposition utility model (Marley & Luce, 2001), dual theory
(Yaari, 1987), the security-potential/aspiration model (Lopes, 1987), and rank-dependent
probability weighting theory (Quiggin, 1982). Probability weighting in these models often
depends on the rank of the payoff that they correspond to, compared to the other payoffs in
the same gamble. Many such weight transformations do not involve only the probability
itself, but rather differences in weighted cumulative probabilities.
Other risky choice models with weight-based transformations are salience theory (Bor-
dalo et al., 2012) and the importance sampling model (Lieder et al., 2017), in which
probability weights depend on the differences between the resolutions in the corresponding
state of the world. Likewise, models such as weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983), the rank-
affected multiplicative weights and transfer of exchange models (Birnbaum, 1997, 2008),
and venture theory (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990) transform probability weights, based on the
structure of payoffs and probabilities in the gamble in consideration.
Finally, as with value-based transformations, some models of risky choice transform the
weights on a payoff independently of the payoffs of the choice options. Prominent examples
include the subjective expected utility model (Edwards, 1955), and various derivatives such
as the odds-based subjective weighted utility model (Karmarkar, 1978), original prospect
theory applied to more than two outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and certainty
equivalence theory (Handa, 1977). Models such as prospective reference theory (Viscusi,
1989), the dual-systems model of risk (Mukherjee, 2010), the dual-systems model of affect
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and deliberation (Loewenstein et al., 2015), the noisy retrieval model (Marchiori et al.,
2015) and distracted decision field theory (Bhatia, 2014), which modify probabilities by
combining them with a uniform distribution, can also be seen as applying a probability-based
transformation.
Many multiattribute choice models also feature weight transformations. For example,
the associative accumulation model weighs attributes based on the presence or absence of
these attributes in other choice options (Bhatia, 2013). This is also a feature of recurrent
neural network models of multiattribute choice, in which this type of relationship is dynamic,
and depends on the preferences for the options in consideration (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008;
Holyoak & Simon, 1999). Other models of multiattribute choice that involve weight
transformations include the feature matching model (Houston et al., 1989), the sparse-max
model (Gabaix, 2014). and multiattribute salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2013), which
assume that attributes that involve large differences are more salient and subsequently given
higher weights. Finally, configural weight theories with multiplicative (Birnbaum, 1974),
rank-based (Birnbaum & Zimmermann, 1998), or range-based interactions (Birnbaum &
Stegner, 1979) across attributes apply these interactions to attribute weights.
Intertemporal choice theories that utilize weight-based transformations include models
which compare time delays of the options with each other, such as the tradeoff and extended
tradeoff models (Read & Scholten, 2012; Scholten & Read, 2010), the proportional dif-
ference model (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016), the ITCH model (Ericson et al., 2015),
the focusing model (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013), the interval discounting model (Read, 2001),
the weighted multiattribute intertemporal choice model (Cubitt et al., 2018), the ASAP
model (Kable & Glimcher, 2010), and the common-aspect attention model (Green et al.,
2005). These models all transform delay weights based on the other delays (or columns) in
the choice set. Many other intertemporal choice models also apply weight transformations
in the form of time discounting without assuming any type of within or between-option
interactions. To maintain our focus we do not discuss these theories in this section.
4.2.3 Models without Value or Weight Transformations.
There are also some models that do not involve any value or weight transformations. These
are usually highly simplified baseline models, such as the net present value model of
intertemporal choice for money, and the expected value model of risky choice. Certain
multiattribute and risky choice heuristics also involve the simple aggregation of resolutions,
without transforming weights or values (such as payoffs or attribute levels) (Dawes, 1979;
Thorngate, 1980). Note that many other heuristics do involve transformations of the
available choice options, but these transformations cannot be easily categorized as involving
values and weights. These heuristics do often cause certain payoffs or attribute levels to
play a disproportionately more important role in the choice but whether this importance
stems from increased value or an increased weight depends on subjective interpretations of
the algorithms implemented by the models.
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Now we will examine four specific types of operations that decision modellers have
utilized to perform these interactions and transformations. Although different models may
instantiate each operation in different ways, these four operations capture the most general
types of assumptions regarding the influence of attribute levels, payoffs, importance weights,
time delays, or probabilities, on the choice process. Each type of operation can apply to
within- and between-option comparisons, and to value and weight-based transformations,
and there is considerable overlap between risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal models
in their use of these different operations.
4.3 Operations
4.3.1 Property 5: Ordinality.
Perhaps the simplest type of operation involves replacing cardinal with ordinal information.
Recall that baseline models assume the weighted aggregation of cardinal utilities. Models
that utilize ordinal operations instead specify choice as the product of “best” or “worst” (or
more generally, ranked) comparisons between resolutions both within and between options.
Rational choice models based on ordinal information have a long history in economics (e.g.,
Arrow, 1951; Hicks, 1939).
The lexicographic heuristic (e.g., Fishburn, 1974) is among the most studied of heuris-
tics. It assumes that decision makers consider only a single column attribute and then select
the option with the most preferred resolution in that column. Similar ordinal comparisons
are also at play with weighted and non-weighted variants of the tallying heuristic that assume
decision makers rank resolutions in every column and then select the option that is the best
on the largest number of these attributes (Huber, 1979; Russo & Dosher, 1983). Likewise,
there is the elimination by least attractive heuristic (Montgomery & Svenson, 1976) which
assumes that decision makers consider columns sequentially but then successively weed out
options that are the worst in each column. The dominance heuristic (Ariely & Wallsten,
1995; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005) selects options only if they outperform at least one option
in every column. The heuristics outlined by Marewski and Mehlhorn (2011) also feature
ordinal comparisons, as do conjunctive and disjunctive heuristics (Dawes, 1964), which
apply ordinal comparisons within the attributes of an option.
Ordinal rules are also found in risky choice. The minimax, maximax and minimax regret
rules (Thorngate, 1980), for example, choose options by comparing their absolute worst or
absolute best resolutions. Likewise, the information processing model (Payne & Braunstein,
1971), the BEAST model (Erev et al., 2017), and the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al.,
2006) feature a sequence of these ordinal comparisons, involving, for example, comparisons
of minimum gain. The most probable winner heuristic (Blavatskyy, 2006) applies ordinal
comparisions to probabilities. Thorngate (1980) outlines several other heuristic rules that
draw on ordinal rather than cardinal comparisons. These include the low payoff elimination
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heuristic, the better than average heuristic, the most likely heuristic, the least likely heuristic,
the probable heuristic, and the low expected payoff elimination heuristic.
Many non-heuristic models also rely on ordinal comparisons. For example, in multiat-
tribute choice, the options as information model (Sher & McKenzie, 2014) uses ranks in
pairwise comparisons between columns to determine the desirability of options, and the
rank-based configural weight models (Birnbaum & Zimmermann, 1998) use the ranks of
resolutions within an option to determine attribute weights (e.g., assigning higher or lower
weights to attributes if they are the best or worst attributes of an option). Ordinal processing
is also found in range-frequency models (Parducci, 1974; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996) where
the rank of a resolution within a column affects how that resolution is evaluated.
In risky choice, decision by sampling (Stewart et al., 2006) determines a given res-
olution’s desirability based on its rank amongst all resolutions experienced previously.
Likewise, expected value calculations in the computationally rational choice model allows
for ordinal comparisons across gambles (Howes et al., 2016). Other similar examples in-
clude the rank-affected multiplicative weights and transfer of exchange models (Birnbaum,
1997, 2008), which rely on resolution ranks within a gamble to determine column weights.
The rank-weighted leaky accumulator aggregates resolutions weighted by their ranks in the
decision sample (Tsetsos et al., 2012). Aspiration-level models (Diecidue & Van de Ven,
2008) also use ordinal comparisons to evaluate the total probability of surpassing target
payoffs. Finally, rank-dependent utility and related approaches, such as cumulative prospect
theory, assign probability weights based on the relative rank of payoffs within a gamble
(Lopes, 1987; Luce & Fishburn, 1991; Quiggin, 1982; Schmidt et al., 2008; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992; Yaari, 1987).
Intertemporal choice models have not considered the importance of ranks within
columns. But some models have considered ranking between columns, on the time di-
mension. They assume that discounting begins when the earliest outcome is received (even
if the earliest outcome is delayed). These include two subadditive discounting models
(Read, 2001), the interval discounting model (Scholten & Read, 2006) and the ASAP
model (Kable & Glimcher, 2010). Likewise, the proportional difference model (Cheng &
González-Vallejo, 2016) uses the highest payoffs and delays to normalize payoff and delay
differences.
4.3.2 Property 6: Gains and Losses.
Many models assume that negative and positive quantities are processed differently. This is
a key assumption of both original and cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), according to which decision makers evaluate resolutions
as gains and losses relative to some reference point, with losses of a given size having more
impact than gains of the same magnitude (an assumption known as loss aversion). The
idea of loss aversion is ubiquitous. It has been applied to between-option comparisons,
both in risky choice, as with the reference-dependent model (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007)
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and third generation prospect theory (Schmidt et al., 2008), and in multiattribute choice,
as with the riskless reference dependence model and its extensions (Bleichrodt et al.,
2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Weingarten et al., 2019), the componential context
model (Tversky & Simonson, 1993) and the loss-averse leaky competitive accumulation
model (Usher & McClelland, 2004). In these models, decision makers perform pairwise
comparisons between the resolutions of pairs of options and place a greater emphasis on the
differences between negative options than between positive options. The disappointment
model without expectation also features pairwise comparisons between gamble resolutions,
with higher weights on negative comparisons relative to positive comparisons (Delquié &
Cillo, 2006). In intertemporal choice, loss aversion is found in the tradeoff and extended
tradeoff models (Scholten & Read, 2010; Read & Scholten, 2012) and in the reference-
dependent intertemporal choice model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).
Cumulative prospect theory also differentiates between gains and losses in terms of
probability weighting. Particularly, the rank-dependent probability weighting function is
applied separately for gains and for losses, so that payoffs of identical magnitude can be
weighted differently based on whether they are positive or negative (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). The same idea is found in the rank and sign-dependent utility model (Luce &
Fishburn, 1991) and in third generation prospect theory (Schmidt et al., 2008).
Other models assume that the evaluations of positive vs. negative quantities differ but
apply this assumption not to differences between pairs of resolutions but rather differences
between one resolution and the average of all. In risky choice, for instance, disappoint-
ment theory assumes that decision makers evaluate negative deviations from expectations
differently from positive ones (Bell, 1985; Jia et al., 2001; Loomes & Sugden, 1986;
Mellers et al., 1999). A similar assumption underlies the contextual loss aversion model for
between-option multiattribute comparisons (Kivetz et al., 2004).
Other models that permit differences between gains and losses includes the expected loss
ratio model (Edwards, 1956) and the expected loss minimization model (Sheng et al., 2005)
which assume that decision makers use only expected losses (that is, negative differences
in resolutions) while making choices. The additive model of risky decision making (Slovic
& Lichtenstein, 1968) also permits different weights for winning and losing resolutions
in gambles. Dominance-based models are also in this class. These models assume that
options superior to others on every column (i.e., dominant options) are evaluated differently
to options inferior to others on every column (i.e., dominated options), which in turn are
evaluated differently to options without any consistent dominance relationship (Ariely &
Wallsten, 1995; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005). The multi-alternative linear ballistic accumu-
lation model, in which dominance dimensions are given higher weights than indifference
dimensions, can also be seen as possessing this property (Trueblood et al., 2014).
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4.3.3 Property 7: Similarity and Dissimilarity.
Models that specify similarity-based operations within or between options magnify or
diminish the differences between columns or resolutions based on the differences between
them. To illustrate, the editing phase of original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) allows differences between payoffs or probabilities to be ignored if they are very
small. Similarity operations are an important feature of risky choice models that account
for violations of outcome independence using between-option interactions. Regret theory
(Loomes & Sugden, 1982) generalizes the minimax regret rule (Thorngate, 1980) by
allowing the psychological differences between pairs of resolutions in a single state of
the world to grow with objective differences in an accelerating manner. The same idea
is found in salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012) and the importance sampling model
(Lieder et al., 2017), except that these models amplify differences between resolutions by
assigning disproportionately larger weights to those states of the world with larger resolution
differences.
An amplification of between-option differences is also a feature of numerous multi-
attribute choice theories. For example, the similarity contrast model (Mellers & Biagini,
1994) assumes that the weight on a given column increases with differences between options
in that column. The same basic idea appears in multiattribute salience theory (Bordalo et
al., 2013) the sparse-max model (Gabaix, 2014), and the random regret minimization model
(Chorus et al., 2008). Likewise, the feature matching model (Houston et al., 1989) and
the similarity overlap model (Restle, 1961) assume that attributes that are common across
pairs of options are ignored. This leads to higher relative importance for attributes that are
uniquely present in the two options. In intertemporal choice, we observe similar assump-
tions in the focusing model (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013), in which attention is determined by
attribute differences within time periods, and related models (Cubitt et al., 2018).
Interestingly, some multiattribute models assume the opposite effect of similarity. In-
stead of increasing the weight on columns when options differ greatly, these models increase
the importance of columns in which options differ least. The multiattribute linear ballistic
accumulator (Trueblood et al., 2014) is one such model. This type of pattern is also often
generated by the stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo, 2002), which normalizes
attribute differences by the maximum attribute amount compared. Likewise, the contextual
concavity model (Kivetz et al., 2004) assumes that decision makers apply a concave function
to the difference between the attribute level of a given option and the minimum level on that
attribute in the choice set. This leads to an emphasis on similarity rather than dissimilarity,
as concave functions have a higher slope at lower values.
Similarity can also influence processing in other ways. The similarity in context model
(Dhar & Glazer, 1996), for example, suggests that the similarity between pairs of options
in a given column can affect how other options are evaluated within the same column.
The comparison grouping model, in contrast, first examines options that are similar to
each other, before considering other options in the choice space (Guo & Holyoak, 2002).
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Multi-alternative decision field theory also uses global measures of similarity through its
assumption of similarity-based lateral inhibition in the connections between the preferences
for choice options (Roe et al., 2001). Likewise, the contextual utility model assumes that
options that are globally similar to others are less desirable compared to relatively unique
options (Rooderkerk et al., 2011). It is also useful to note that models that sample attributes
sequentially such as decision field theory and its variants (Bhatia, 2013; Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004) indirectly emphasize
attribute dimensions with a large dispersion in resolutions, even though attribute weighting
and attention probabilities are independent of attribute similarities. Additionally, stochastic
models such as the contextual utility model (Wilcox, 2011) and the wandering vector model
(Carroll & De Soete, 1991) allow for similarity-based noise effects.
Finally, lexicographic semiorders, which only consider attributes on which the available
options are different enough, also emphasize dissimilarity on attributes. This is the case
for such models in multiattribute choice (Tversky, 1969), risky choice (Leland, 1994;
Rubinstein, 1988), and variants of these models in intertemporal choice (Leland, 2002;
Rubinstein, 2003). The more general additive difference model is also based on this
assumption (Tversky, 1969). The PRAM model (Loomes, 2010) allows for ‘smoother’
similarity/dissimilarity effects on both the probability and the payoff dimensions.
4.3.4 Property 8: Statistical Distributions.
Models often draw on distributional information about columns and resolutions, especially
when these are expressed in quantitative form such as probabilities or monetary payoffs.
One important class of models uses payoff averages to normalize payoff values. In disap-
pointment based models (Bell, 1985; Jia et al., 2001; Loomes & Sugden, 1986; Mellers
et al., 1999), for example, decision makers compare each gamble payoff with the expected
value of the gamble, and evaluate payoffs worse than the expected value differently than
payoffs better than the expected value. In multiattribute choice, the contextual loss aversion
model assumes that decision makers compute the average attribute levels of the options in
a choice set and, like other loss aversion models, give greater importance to negative devi-
ations from the average compared to positive deviations within attribute columns (Kivetz
et al., 2004). The Bayesian model of context sensitive value (Rigoli et al., 2017) also uses
sequentially computed averages to normalize attribute values prior to aggregation.
Intertemporal choice models of sequences have used normalization (Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1993). These theories compare the payoff in a time period with the average payoffs
provided by the choice option. Relatedly, normalization comes into play in the ITCH model
(Ericson et al., 2015) which assumes that differences between choice components (either
payoffs or time delays) are divided by the average component offered in the choice set. The
DRIFT model (Read et al., 2013), makes the same assumption, as does the proportional
difference model (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016).
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Many models use averages for purposes other than normalization. These assume that
the average resolution for a column influences the weight assigned to that column. These
operations are commonly at play in theories of multiattribute choices which assume a
bidirectional relationship between the choice options available to the decision maker and the
attributes. These theories include the ECHO model (Holyoak & Simon, 1999), the parallel
constraint satisfaction model for decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Glöckner et
al., 2014), as well as the associative accumulation model (Bhatia, 2013). A related use of
attribute averages is adopted by the contextual utility model to study the compromise effect
(Rooderkerk et al., 2011). In intertemporal choice, the endogenous determination of time
preference model (Becker & Mulligan, 1997) also assumes the discount rate for an option
is inversely related to the average of the resolutions of that option.
Other models utilize the variance of the distribution of payoffs to judge the total value
of options. Indeed, models in this class are some of the oldest in the area of risky choice
(Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Dyer & Jia, 1997; Markowitz, 1959), due in large part to the
importance of outcome variance as a driver of the famous Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).
These models assume that decision makers dislike gambles with high variance payoffs.
Models utilizing the coefficient of variation (Weber et al., 2004) combine this idea with
normalization, by dividing the standard deviation by the expected value. The use of
variance is also involved in multiattribute choice theories, such as the attribute scatter model
(Ganzach, 1995) which proposes people like options having more dispersed resolutions –
showing a preference for variance rather than an aversion to it.
Many models hold that the perceptions, weights and evaluations of columns and reso-
lutions can be affected by their range. Models that apply range-based operations generally
assume that increasing the range of values reduces the perceived difference between any
pair of values. This type of operation is perhaps best known as the range principle of range-
frequency theory, which states that utilities and desirability ratings are spaced out in equal
segments of the attribute range (Parducci, 1974; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). A range-based
operation is a key feature of the range-normalization model, which is inspired by the neuro-
computational processes known to be at play in perception and other psychological domains
(Soltani et al., 2012). The range of probabilities and payoffs within a gamble is also used
in some configural weight models (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979). Finally, a closely related
type of normalization is performed by the stochastic difference model (González-Vallejo,
2002), which uses the maximum (but not the minimum) of the range of values in calculating
values. Range also plays a similar role in the normalized contextual concavity model, which
assumes that an attribute is evaluated by taking the ratio of its difference with the smallest
level on that attribute, to the range of levels on that attribute (Kivetz et al., 2004).
4.3.5 Other Types of Operations.
The four operations identified above do not capture all of the diverse ways in which decision
models transform, compare, and aggregate the various components of the choice options.
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There are some other operations that we haven’t considered that are specific to one of the
three domains. For example, some intertemporal choice models allow decision makers to
evaluate increasing vs. decreasing payoff sequences across time periods differently (e.g.,
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993); such operations do not play a role in risky or multiattribute
choice because they, unlike time, usually have no natural ordering of the columns. Addi-
tionally, there are types of operations that only exist within certain disciplines or modeling
frameworks. For example, a large class of models in psychology involve the sequential
sampling and aggregation of resolutions over time (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993);
these models are relatively uncommon in other fields (though their popularity is growing).
Despite these omissions, our taxonomy is a valuable starting point for understanding the
elemental computational operations involved in preferential decision making, as it identifies
a core set of recurring insights and assumptions shared by models across the domains of
risk, time, and multiattribute choice, and across diverse disciplines.
5 General Discussion
5.1 “Establishing the Laws of Preferential Choice Behavior”
When Krantz et al. (1974) explained why they excluded preferential choice research from
their seminal survey of mathematical psychology, they argued that while the field had
many excellent papers and ideas, these neither built on one another, nor yielded cohesive
theoretical insights, nor gave any sense of an accumulation of knowledge.
Five years later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) published prospect theory. This paper
had a profound multidisciplinary impact, influencing psychology, economics, marketing,
management, finance, cognitive science, and neuroscience. It is usually taken as the birth of
the behavioral approach in decision theory. It triggered the development of a large number
competing models of preferential choice behavior, each based on a seemingly unique set
of assumptions and each yielding a seemingly differentiated set of behavioral predictions.
The net result is that now there may be even less of a sense of refinement and unification
than when Krantz et al. commented upon it almost half a century ago.
A single unified decision theory may not be feasible but we have attempted to provide
a framework for characterising models by means of a set of core properties that can be
argued to be at play in preferential choice (see also He et al., in press a, for a complementary
computational investigation of this problem). At an early stage in the evolution of this paper,
we had thought that this approach may be able to yield something akin to a decision-theory
analogue of Barlow and Morgenstern’s (1948) Dictionary of Musical Themes. That dictio-
nary proposed a notation scheme that allowed someone, hearing a tune that is unfamiliar
to them, to check for its prior existence and to locate it with respect to other tunes that
are similar to it. We had initially hoped to find some system that would, by identifying
core model properties, enable us to assign the equivalent of a ‘barcode’ to any model in
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the domains we have considered. The idea was that two models sharing the same barcode
would, in effect, be identical in terms of underlying assumptions and behavioral predictions.
However, it became clear that such an approach would not take us very far. For example,
it transpired that two models could appear to be quite closely aligned on many core properties
(sharing much of the barcode) and yet have substantially different implications, depending
on the particular way a certain property is specified (e.g., whether similarity attracts greater
weight or whether similar features are ignored), and the way it is interpreted (e.g., whether
it is seen to be a product of attention or emotion or a neurocognitive mechanism). So,
we adopted a less digital and more qualitative approach involving more general properties,
as summarised in Table 2 (also see He et al., 2021 – a, for computational approach for
addressing this problem). While these properties may be less precise and more open to
interpretation than a tight codification, we believe they form the blocks with which decision
models of choice are most often built. Importantly, as these properties are drawn from
recurring insights in decision modeling (insights shared by a large number of different
models), they can be assumed to capture a theoretical consensus regarding where the “laws
of preferential choice” are likely to reside.
5.2 Core Implications
It is useful to briefly revisit what these properties imply about choice behavior, starting with
Category 1 in Table 2. “Violations” of independence axioms or assumptions, some of which
entail preference reversals and intransitive choice cycles, are perhaps the most striking and
most widely discussed decision biases. These include the Allais-type paradoxes, various
context effects in multiattribute choice, and sequence effects in intertemporal choice. All
attempts to model these phenomena do so by assuming interactions within or between the
components of the choice options. The ubiquity of these choice patterns, and the difficulty
of seeing how they could be produced without some kind of interactions, suggest that those
laws of choice behavior we eventually settle on will include such interactions.
The laws of choice behavior are also likely to make room for transformations of both
the values of the resolutions of the choice options (e.g., attributes or payoffs), and of the
probabilities, weights, and time delays associated with these resolutions. These two types
of transformations reflect different intuitions regarding the determinants of behavior.
Transformations of values often involve an affective component. Indeed, the values
ascribed to resolutions are often assumed to reflect the pleasure or displeasure they are
expected to generate, and decision models that involve transformations of these values,
such as models of disappointment, regret, aspiration, and loss aversion, often emphasize
this affective (or utilitarian) underpinning. For instance, if people are likely to experience
regret, or disappointment, then it is arguably rational to act on those anticipations in risky
choice. Or, if they will savour the prospect of positive future experiences and dread negative
ones, then again, these sources of utility or disutility should rationally be taken into account
when making intertemporal choices.
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By contrast, many operations modifying decision weights involve a perceptual or cog-
nitive component – underweighting and/or overweighting probabilities and redistributing
attention and judgments of relative importance to different time horizons or different at-
tributes. Arguably these may (in some cases at least) be regarded as errors since they may
lead to dynamic inconsistency and to choices of options that may, on reflection, be regarded
as suboptimal.
Category 3 identifies four broad types of operations frequently involved in transforming
and aggregating the components of choice options. These types of operation each have
something to tell us about how decision makers process the choice problem. Computa-
tions of ordinality, for example, are often seen as reflecting the use of cognitive shortcuts
and most of the models that we classify as involving ordinal computations are heuristics.
Even ordinality-based models that are not heuristics often rely on comparisons that ignore
magnitude-based information and simplify the choice problem.
Likewise, the differential evaluation of gains and losses has been incorporated into
decision theory most prominently via its role in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), and many of the models we classify as involving these operations are extensions
of prospect theory. There are also models in this category that are not directly related to
prospect theory. However, in their use of gain- and loss-based information, these models
share important computational similarities with prospect theory models and could even be
seen as utilizing some of the same cognitive and affective mechanisms as prospect theory.
The use of similarity-based operations stems from the importance of differences between
resolutions, the perception of these differences, and the effect of these differences on
attention and emotion. Arguably, being able to identify the elements that require little or no
attention and focus mental effort on those involving the greatest relative gains and losses,
is a more efficient use of finite cognitive resources. This is closely related to our fourth
type of operation, which involves transforming values or weights based on the statistical
properties of the choice problem. The use of these statistical properties – mean, variance,
skewness, range – reflects the fact that perceptions and evaluations are sensitive to the
distributions of the variables in consideration. Similarity and distribution-based operations
reflect fundamental psychological insights about cognition, which extend beyond decision
making research, and it is common to see these types of computations in formal models of
social judgment, perception, categorization, and memory.
Although the baseline model in the three domains we have considered essentially pro-
poses no within-option interactions (other than the combination of values and weights
required to produce a weighted average) and no between-option interactions (at all), we
have seen that a wide variety of interactions have been proposed; and that these can be
defended either on normative grounds (mostly where second-order preferences, involving
regret, disappointment, aspiration, and other affective states, are involved) or on descriptive
grounds (especially where particular comparisons or operations may reflect the finite cog-
nitive resources deployed by non-specialist decision makers participating in experiments).
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Once we allow that any and all of these operations may have at least some part to play in
at least some choice scenarios, it becomes easy to understand why no single model provides
a comprehensive account of the whole gamut of observed behavioral regularities. The value
placed on conciseness and elegance in modeling, and the objective of keeping down the
degrees of freedom permitted by a model in the interests of refutability, may be laudable
tenets for theoretical development; but when a process is as multifaceted and organic as
human decision making, some balance needs to be struck between parsimony and realism,
and it may be that this balance needs to be adjusted in favour of more degrees of freedom
and greater realism.
5.3 Trends in Decision Modeling
We are the first to collect and synthesize such large number of distinct decision models, and
consequently we are able to provide a unique perspective on trends in decision modeling
research. The easiest trend to identify involves the distribution of decision models over
time, displayed in Figure 1. This figure summarizes the publication decades of the modeling
papers cited in our synthesis (with each paper included only if it presents what we consider
to be a model that can be distinguished from any extant model, and if it is the first publication
of such a model). Of course, there is some ambiguity regarding the precise numbers in this
figure. Firstly, they pertain only to the publication dates of individual papers. It some cases,
papers may contain several distinctive features, whereas other papers may be largely seen as
refining or extending existing models. Moreover, our synthesis has undoubtedly excluded
relevant models, leading to an inadvertent but potentially systematic bias in the precise
numbers involved (we expect that most of these exclusions involve older models, which are
often difficult to find, but some of the excluded models may also be very recent – i.e. models
that have not yet come to our attention). Despite these caveats, Figure 1 indicates there has
been a heavy growth in the total number of decision models, and that the number of such
models is still growing. Additionally, risky and multiattribute choice models are the earliest
and the most popular models. Intertemporal choice models, in contrast, are relatively fewer
and much more recent. In total there are more than 100 papers that have published novel or
unique risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal decision models, according to our estimates.
Figure 2 presents a breakdown of papers publishing decision models by field. Here
we have considered four categories, based on the primary focus of the journal the paper is
published in: psychology (which includes neuroscience and cognitive science), economics
(which includes decision theory and decision analysis), business (which includes manage-
ment and marketing), and general (which includes books, as well as general interest journals
publishing papers from multiple scientific disciplines). We again include a paper only if
it presents what we consider to be a unique model, and if it is the first publication of the
model. Additionally, the numbers pertain to the published papers, and some papers may
have multiple models, which we do not count as separate instances. Thus, as with Figure 1,
the numbers in this figure are imprecise. That said, we can note some systematic patterns in
1353
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 16, No. 6, November 2021 Laws of preferential choice






















Figure 1: The number of papers publishing unique decision models discussed in our syn-
thesis, based on decade of publication.
this figure. Firstly, the field with the most publications is psychology, followed by economics
and business. Additionally, different fields focus on different decision domains. Although
all three of the core fields have decision models for all three decision domains, economics
involves a much higher proportion of risky decision models (likely due to the central role
of risk in finance and economics), and a much smaller proportion of multiattribute decision
models. This pattern is reversed for business (likely due to the central role of multiattribute
considerations in consumer choice). Psychology also tends to have more multiattribute than
risky choice papers, though the distribution is more balanced. Overall, the journal with the
most published papers in our synthesis is Psychological Review which has published more
than 20 papers with unique decision models over the past seven decades.
More interesting than the distribution of models over time, disciplines, and domains,
is the distribution of properties across models. It is here that we have noticed some odd
patterns. Consider, for example, the fact that models of risky choice largely satisfy between-
option independence but not within-option independence, whereas the opposite is the case
for models of multiattribute and intertemporal choice. However, it seems that violations of
within-option independence are more reasonable in multiattribute and intertemporal tasks.
Attributes quite naturally influence each other’s evaluation, and consumption in one time
period strongly affects preferences over consumption in future time periods. The same is not
so plausibly the case for state-contingent outcomes, in which events are disjoint — certainly
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s independence axiom may appear quite compelling for
risky choice, but not for its multiattribute and intertemporal counterparts. Thus, if there are
differences in behaviors across the tasks, we should expect them to pertain to the increased
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Figure 2: The number of papers publishing unique decision models discussed in our syn-
thesis, based on field.
number of violations of within-option independence in multiattribute and intertemporal
tasks. Consequently, we should expect multiattribute and intertemporal models to feature
more violations of within-option independence compared to their risky counterparts.
The fact that we observe precisely the opposite pattern points to a somewhat ironic
aspect of decision making research. The generation of decision models has been strongly
driven by counter-intuitive violations of normative rationality. Within-option dependence
is a particularly counter-intuitive violation in risky choice, and thus most decision models
of risky choice explicitly feature this dependence. It is not a counter-intuitive violation
in multiattribute and intertemporal choice, and is therefore omitted from nearly all corre-
sponding decision models. In trying to explain surprising paradoxes, it seems that decision
models may have failed to explain the obvious.
5.4 A Way Forward
With a large number of models already in existence, and new ones still being proposed,
our classification system will enable researchers to understand better the similarities and
distinctions between different models and perhaps judge more easily the added value offered
by would-be entrants into this already crowded field. Additionally, by providing an easily
accessible list of previous models, we hope to encourage more comprehensive model
evaluations that compare new models against the full set of previous choice models proposed
in a given domain. Such comparisons could be either based on quantitative model fits to
choice datasets (Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; He et al., in press b), or on qualitative choice
properties that are revealed in experimental tests (see e.g. Birnbaum, 2008). New models
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may provide a good post hoc explanation for certain findings, but in order to understand
their contribution to the field, they need to be evaluated holistically, that is, in combination
with all theories that have been proposed for the choice task under consideration.
We would even go so far as to recommend that we avoid building new models with
narrow assumptions, and instead concentrate on understanding the general properties (such
as those that we have outlined above) that have been previously proposed for preferential
choice. Most of these properties are at play in all the three domains that we consider, and it
is likely that any model that omits even one of these properties will fail in particular ways or
contexts. For example, independence of alternatives (and in turn transitivity) is violated in
various risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal decision scenarios so that any model which
does not allow for between-option interactions will be descriptively incomplete in those
circumstances.
Refocusing scholarly attention on the broader properties that characterize choice behav-
ior, rather than specific functional instantiations of these properties in individual models,
would involve performing experimental tests comparing not two specific models, but two
sets of properties or two different instantiations of a given property. For example, it would
be more reasonable to ask whether the range or variance of resolutions play a bigger role in
the evaluation of options, than it would be to directly compare a specific range-based model
with a specific variance-based model. On a theoretical level, research could attempt to ex-
amine how the above properties are instantiated in the mind and in the brain, or investigate
the general behavioral properties implied by these properties. It would not be unreasonable
to claim that models that apply the same properties also require the same cognitive and
neural processes to be implemented, and additionally, help achieve similar computational
and statistical goals.
Of course, we recognize that science has many goals, and that descriptive adequacy
and theoretical novelty may not be the only guiding principles for decision modelers (e.g.,
Glöckner & Betsch, 2011; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Roberts & Pashler, 2000; for
alternative perspectives). Additionally, scholars in different disciplines may wish to continue
developing and refining models that address their particular research problem. Decision
theorists, for example, might want to keep exploring the representational implications of
various axiomatic restrictions on choice, whereas cognitive psychologists might want to keep
exploring new ways to predict attention, memory, response time and other psychological
variables. The development of several new theories may also be beneficial for a completely
new choice task or behavioral domain. However, it is also clear that continuing to create
new models of risky, intertemporal and multiattribute choice, with a narrow set of slightly
different assumptions, tweaked to predict a rather specific set of choice patterns, is inefficient
and, to the extent that it adds traffic to an already crowded thoroughfare, counterproductive.
After many decades of decision modeling, and particularly since the late 1970s, it is perhaps
time to pause, reflect on what has been done, and think critically of the ways in which existing
models can inform future research. By examining the underlying similarities between a
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very large group of these models, and using these similarities to uncover the key properties,
or laws, of preferential choice behavior, this paper provides a set of organizing principles
for such an endeavour.
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